In most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by events that take place off the equilibrium path. I propose an alternative approach: an equilibrium concept, in which players can only use events that take place on the equilibrium path itself to justify their beliefs.
Introduction
Game-theoretic equilibrium concepts are based on two components: a criterion by which players respond to their beliefs, and a criterion that justifies these beliefs. For example, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) presumes utility maximization as the former criterion: players optimize with respect to their beliefs. The criterion for justifying equilibrium beliefs is the following: player j justifies his belief in player i's threats with the argument that if he had counterfactually tested any of these threats, player i would have wanted to realize them. Equilibrium beliefs are thus justified by events that take place off the equilibrium path. This property is shared by all refinements of Nash equilibrium (NE): players validate their beliefs with counterfactual events that are never observed along the equilibrium path.
In this paper I construct an equilibrium concept, which requires players to justify their equilibrium beliefs by events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. If a player rationalizes his equilibrium actions by attributing threats to his opponents, he seeks evidence for the threats' existence in the actual equilibrium path. Roughly put, he must see a threat in equilibrium, in order to believe it. This "on-path observability" criterion requires far less strategic sophistication from players, relative to the "off-path credibility" criterion which underlies SPE. In order to persuade himself that a threat is real, the player need not contemplate the opponents' counterfactual behavior: he can verify the threat's reality directly, simply by looking at the history of the game.
For expositional purposes, I will restrict attention to infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games with discounting. The fundamental problem in repeated games is whether (and by means of which social norms) non-myopic behavior is sustainable. A repeated-game player takes a myopically inferior action only if he can rationalize it with a threat of his opponent to punish him if he plays myopically. According to the equilibrium concept that I propose, called "Nash Equilibrium with Tests" (NEWT), this threat must be evident from the equilibrium path. Specifically, the player must test any threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action. Both the tests and the optimal response to the threats are part of equilibrium behavior. The player's equilibrium strategy carries out both tasks.
The idea that players validate their belief in a threat by testing it first is intuitive. For example, imagine two roommates who try to reach a cooperative modus vivendi that will keep their apartment clean. Roommate 1 verifies that doing his share of the housework is optimal, by first testing Roommate 2's threat to stop doing his share if Roommate 1 shirks. Alternatively, consider a country leader who faces an aggressive rival country in a repeated Chicken-like situation. The leader believes that her country needs to fight in order for the aggressive rival country to yield; she validates this claim by first trying to play dovishly, thus verifying the uselessness of the dovish move.
In both examples, the player eventually chooses the non-myopic action prescribed by long-run optimization. This action is rationalized by a threat, and the player validates the belief in the threat by testing it first. The modeling innovation in this paper is to make this kind of threat testing the cornerstone of an equilibrium concept, such that a strategy profile is unstable if it leaves untested any of the threats that rationalize any of the non-myopic actions that are taken along the play path. (I discuss alternative modeling approaches in Section 5.1.)
Because the notion of threat testing is central to the equilibrium concept, we shall need a language to describe threats and what it means to test them. The formalism of finite automata, by now a conventional language for representing repeated-game strategies (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Ch. 8.) ), will serve this function. A finite automaton is a 'machine' that consists of a finite set of internal states (one of which is specified to be the initial state), an output function and a transition function. Given that player i's automaton is in a certain state at period t of the game, the output function specifies the player's action at period t as a function of the state. The transition function determines his state at period t + 1, as a function of the current state and the opponent's action at period t.
To introduce the equilibrium concept, it will be useful to have "Chicken" as our stage game (unless explicitly specified otherwise, "Chicken" will always refer to the following payoff matrix, and we will assume that the players' discount factor is arbitrarily close to one):
In order to sustain the cooperative outcome (C, C) in the long-run, we must construct strategies that contain threats to punish deviations. Consider the following strategy for player 1: "start by playing C; continue to play C as long as player 2 plays C; if he plays D, punish him by playing D, then C, and only then return to your initial 'dovish' state of mind."
This strategy for player 1 has a finite-automata representation, which is given diagrammatically by s 1 in Figure 1 . The action C is myopically inferior against itself. Therefore, it is rational for player 2 to play C against the initial state q 0 only because of player 1's threat to punish player 2 if he plays D against the initial state. This threat is represented by the D-transition from q 0 . If player 2 played the same automaton, we would have a Nash equilibrium that sustains infinite repetition of (C, C), such that neither player would ever realize the threat that rationalizes his cooperation.
In contrast, under the equilibrium concept that I propose, threats that rationalize non-myopic actions must actually be tested first. A NEWT is a profile of finite automata, such that along the induced play path, players test (at least once, but no more than finitely many times) every threat that rationalizes a non-myopic action that they plan to take later in the game. Except for the purpose of threat testing, players stick to the actions prescribed by long-run optimization.
Specifically, if player j's best-reply to player i's automaton prescribes a myopically inferior action when player i's automaton is in the state q, then player j must play myopically when he faces q for the first time; but in the long run, player j will play the action prescribed by long-run optimization whenever he faces q. If the action that long-run optimization prescribes for player j against q is also myopically optimal against q, then player j should play this action whenever he faces q.
The pair of automata given by Figure 1 is a NEWT in repeated Chicken. Every automaton contains a single state -q 0 in s 1 and r 1 in s 2 -against which it is rational for the opponent to play non-myopically. And indeed, player 2 plays myopically at period 1, which is the first time that he faces q 0 ; likewise, player 1 plays myopically at period 2, which is the first time that he faces r 1 . Other than that, players stick to the actions prescribed by long-run optimization. They abandon them only for the purpose of testing the threats that rationalize non-myopic actions.
NEWT is not a refinement of Nash equilibrium. Every NEWT that contains non-myopic behavior also contains tests, hence a departure from strict optimization. However, at some period t * , the equilibrium path enters a cyclic phase, in which a repeated-game NE is played. All the tests are confined to the introductory phase prior to t * . In particular, a stage-game NE is played at the first period of any NEWT. A simple existence result immediately follows this observation: NEWT exists if and only if the stage game has a pure-strategy NE. The first set of results in this paper is devoted to characterizing equilibrium outcomes. This characterization results in a departure from standard folk theorems. If the stage game has a dominant-strategy equilibrium which Pareto-dominates any other outcome in the stage game, then only infinite repetition of this outcome is consistent with NEWT. For every symmetric 2 × 2 game which does not belong to this category, there is a "NEWT folk theorem". I find this departure from standard folk theorems quite attractive: when both individual and collective rationality imply the same unique outcome in the stage game, the case for sustained non-myopic behavior in the repeated game is intuitively weak.
The second set of results deals with the structure of equilibrium strategies. I study restrictions on the structure of equilibrium strategies which reflect familiar norms of punishment. My objective is to understand how these norms affect the sustainability of cooperation under NEWT. One of the norms that I examine is reciprocity. Reciprocal behavior is often considered to be a "good" norm for sustaining cooperation. In the context of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, this intuition has been corroborated by the computer tournaments of Axelrod (1984) , as well as by a number of theoretical works in the "reputation" literature (Kreps et. al. (1982) , Watson (1994) ).
I re-examine this intuition under NEWT in the context of both Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. An automaton satisfies a property called "constructive reciprocity" if it reciprocates the opponent's action whenever in a "cooperative state of mind". This is a weaker norm of reciprocity than Tit-for-Tat, because the latter norm always reciprocates the opponent's action. In Figure 1 , s 2 satisfies constructive reciprocity, whereas s 1 violates this property. This violation is not accidental. In every NEWT that sustains long-run cooperation in repeated Chicken, at least one player must violate constructive reciprocity.
This result reveals a sense, in which reciprocal behavior is an obstruction to sustained cooperation in repeated Chicken. Conversely, in the case of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, both players must satisfy constructive reciprocity in order to build up sustained cooperation in minimal time. Thus, the same reciprocity norm that hampers cooperation in repeated Chicken, enables players to build up cooperation swiftly in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
What is the intuition behind this difference? In both games, there must be an introductory phase because players must tests the threats that rationalize their sustained cooperation. In both games, constructive reciprocity implies a period of (D, D) during this phase. In Prisoner's Dilemma, (D, D) is a stage-game NE and therefore calls for no further tests. In Chicken, D is not a myopic best-reply to itself; each player must test the threat that rationalizes this non-myopic move. As it turns out, these tests give rise to another period of (D, D), which triggers further tests, and so forth. Thus, reciprocal behavior generates much more threat testing in Chicken than in Prisoner's Dilemma, and this causes the radically different implications of this norm in these two games.
To summarize, the paper accomplishes three objectives. First, it presents an example of a solution concept which is based on a simple belief-selection criterion, namely that equilibrium beliefs be justified only by events that take place on the equilibrium path. Second, the solution concept implies a departure from the standard folk theorems, without having to perturb the original game. Third, armed with this concept, we are able to gain new insights into the role of social norms such as reciprocity on the sustainability of cooperation.
The Equilibrium Concept
I define the solution concept for infinitely repeated 2 × 2 games with perfect information and discounting. The scope is deliberately restricted for expositional clarity; generalizations are discussed in Section 5. Let A denote the stage-game action set for both players. For every a ∈ A, −a denotes the other action in A. Let u j denote player j's stage-game payoff function. Without loss of generality, assume that for every a i ∈ A, arg max a j ∈A u j (a i , a j ) is a singleton -i.e., that there is a unique stage-game best-reply for player j against a i .
As to repeated-game strategies, I consider only pure strategies having a finite automata representation. An automaton is a quadruple (Q i , q
where: Q i is a finite set of machine states; q 0 i is the initial state; f i : Q i → A is an output function, which specifies the action taken by player i when he is in state q ∈ Q i ; and τ i : Q i × A → Q i is a transition function, where τ i (q, a j ) specifies the state to which the automaton switches from state q ∈ Q i when the opponent plays a j ∈ A against q. We will say that q ∈ Q i as an astate if f i (q) = a; and we will say that q ∈ Q i has a constant transition if τ i (q, a j ) = τ i (q, −a j ). Henceforth, s i denotes an automaton for player i.
The path induced by (
.. , where a t i ∈ A is player i's action at period t, such that a
, define a function p i : {0, 1, ...} → Q i , which depicts the evolution of player i's machine state along z (s 1 , s 2 ), where p i (t) = q signifies that s i is in the state q at period t. We will say that player j faces a state q ∈ Q i at period t if p i (t) = q. We will say that a state q ∈ Q i is visited in z(s 1 , s 2 ) if p i (t) = q for some t in z(s 1 , s 2 ).
It is known that a profile of automata induces a path that eventually enters a cycle: there exist a period t * and an integer L, such that p i (t) = p i (t + L) for every i = 1, 2, t ≥ t * . In the sequel, t * always denotes the period in which the cyclic phase of z(s 1 , s 2 ) begins.
By the assumption of discounting, finding a best-reply to s i is a Markovian decision problem with a well-defined solution. For every q ∈ Q i , let A * (q) ⊆ A be the set of actions for player j, which are consistent with best-replying to s i at any period t for which p i (t) = q. In other words, A * (q) is the set of actions which optimization against s i may prescribe for player j, conditional on player i being in q. Any best-reply to s i prescribes an action in A * (q) whenever player i is in q. See Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Ch. 9) for further details.
For every q ∈ Q i , denote br j (q) = arg max a j ∈A u j [f i (q), a j ]. That is, br j (q) is player j's myopic best-reply action against q. By contrast, let BR j (q) denote player j's long-run best-reply action against q. This is the action that long-run optimization prescribes for player j when player i is in the state q. When A * (q) is a singleton, A * (q) = {BR j (q)}. When A * (q) contains more than one element, select BR j (q) to be the myopically optimal action against q in A * (q). Formally,
That is, if player j fails to play BR j (q) against q, player i's automaton switches to a different state than if player j does play BR j (q) against q.
Most of the concepts and definitions introduced so far are standard and taken from Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Ch. 8 and 9). The functions p, br and BR constitute the only new pieces of notation in this paper.
Example. Let us illustrate the notation using Figure 1. (Payoff specifications are as given in Section 1.) Player 1's automaton is:
and τ (q 2 , ·) = q 0 . Given this automaton, player 2's myopic best-reply action against q 0 is br 2 (q 0 ) = D. Player 2's long-run best-reply action against q 0 is BR 2 (q 0 ) = C, because playing always D against q 0 yields a maximal discounted payoff of 11 3 , whereas playing always C against q 0 yields a discounted payoff of 4. Because q 1 and q 2 have constant transitions, the myopic and longrun best-reply actions against these states coincide:
Given this automaton, the myopic best-reply actions for player 1 are: br 1 (r 0 ) = C and br 1 (r 1 ) = D. The long-run best-reply action against r 0 is BR 1 (r 0 ) = C, because r 0 is a constant-transition state. The long-run best-reply action against r 1 is BR 2 (r 1 ) = C, because playing always D against r 1 yields a maximal discounted payoff of 3, whereas playing always C against r 1 yields a discounted payoff of 4.
We are now ready to formulate an equilibrium concept, which requires players to test the threats that rationalize their future non-myopic actions.
Definition 1 An automata profile (s 1 , s 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium with tests (NEWT) if for every q ∈ Q i , i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6 = i:
The first condition in Definition 1 says that if the long-run best-reply action against q ∈ Q i is non-myopic, then player j should play myopically when he faces q for the first time, yet play the long-run best-reply action against q in the long run. The second condition says that if the myopic and long-run best-reply actions against q coincide, player j should always play this action whenever he faces q.
NEWT is an equilibrium concept, in which players validate their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. Playing non-myopically can only be justified by the presence of a threat to punish the myopic move. The point of view underlying NEWT is that this justification must be evident from actual, rather than counterfactual, behavior. Therefore, the threat that justifies the non-myopic move must be tested in equilibrium.
1 By contrast, playing myopically does not require any elaborate justification, hence NEWT does not require players to take any special actions to justify it.
Example. Let us show that the automata profile given by Figure 1 is a NEWT in repeated Chicken. Consider player 2's reaction to s 1 . Since BR 2 (q 0 ) = C whereas br 2 (q 0 ) = D, NEWT requires player 2 to play D as soon as he faces q 0 , and to play C against q 0 in the long run. And indeed, player 2 plays D against q 0 at period 1, which is the first time that he faces q 0 , and he plays C against q 0 from period 4 onwards. Every other state in player 1's automaton has a constant transition, hence the long-run and myopic bestreply actions against these states coincide. NEWT requires player 2 to play C whenever he faces q 1 and D whenever he faces q 2 , which is indeed the case. Now turn to player 1's reaction to player 2's automaton. Because f 2 (r 0 ) = D and r 0 is a constant-transition state, C is the myopic as well as long-run best-reply action against r 0 . NEWT requires player 1 to play C whenever he faces r 0 , which is indeed the case. As to r 1 , BR 1 (r 1 ) = C whereas br 1 (r 1 ) = D. NEWT requires player 1 to play D as soon as he faces r 1 and to play C against r 1 in the long run. And indeed, player 1 plays D against r 1 at period 2, which is the first time that he faces r 1 , and he plays C against r 1 in the cyclic phase. 2 What is the relation between NEWT and NE? Any NEWT that induces only myopic behavior is also a repeated-game NE, and vice versa. The reason is that in this case, there is no room for threat testing. In every other case, a given automata profile cannot be a NEWT and a NE at the same time. Every repeated-game NE involving non-myopic behavior is sustained by untested threats, hence it is not a NEWT. Conversely, every NEWT involving nonmyopic behavior is sustained by tested threats; as such, it involves suboptimal behavior, hence it is not a NE.
It follows that NEWT is not a refinement of NE because it sometimes requires players to depart from strict optimization with respect to their beliefs. This departure is not random, but systematic and rule-based. Note that the cyclic phase of NEWT does constitute a repeated-game NE. In fact, every NEWT (s 1 , s 2 ) can be transformed into a NE (s
Example. Figure 2 provides another example of NEWT in repeated Chicken. Consider player 1's reaction to s 2 . His best-reply actions are:
Only in the latter case do his myopic and long-run best-reply actions coincide. And indeed, player 1 plays D against r 0 at period 1, which is the first time that he faces r 0 , and that he plays only C against r 0 in the cyclic phase. He plays D against r 2 whenever he faces it. And he plays C against r 1 at period 2, which is the first time that he faces r 1 . (Player 1 never faces r 1 in the long run, hence condition 1(b) in Definition 1 is vacuously satisfied with respect to r 1 .) Now turn to player 2's reaction to s 1 . His best-reply actions are: BR 2 (q 0 ) = 2 Note that s 1 6 = s 2 . This is not a coincidence. If
But if a t j 6 = br j (q), NEWT requires player j to play br j (q) against q as well, a contradiction. Thus, in order to sustain non-myopic behavior in equilibrium, different players must use different threat structures.
C, BR 2 (q 1 ) = C and BR 2 (q 2 ) = D. Only in the first case do his myopic and long-run best-reply actions coincide. And indeed, player 2 plays C against q 0 whenever he faces it. He plays D at period 2, which is the first time that he faces q 1 , and he plays only C against q 1 in the cyclic phase. And he plays C at period 3, which is the first time that he faces q 2 . (Player 2 never faces q 2 in the long run, hence condition 1(b) in Definition 1 is vacuously satisfied with respect to q 2 .) Thus, we have a NEWT. In this example, the state q 2 is visited only because player 2 tests the threat associated with q 1 . Similarly, the state r 1 is visited only because player 1 tests the threat associated with q 0 . According to NEWT, players have to test every threat that rationalizes a non-myopic action that they take, even if the threat is faced only as a result of testing another threat. I refer to such threats as "high-order threats". As we shall see in the sequel, the fact that NEWT does not exempt players from testing high-order threats is important for some of our results.
Example 2 thus illustrates an important feature of the solution concept. According to NEWT, Threat testing is not a consequence of the criterion by which players respond to their equilibrium beliefs, but a consequence of the criterion by which they justify these beliefs. It is a necessary outcome of the belief-selection criterion, and as such, it is not subjected to trading off the costs and benefits of the tests. Any threat that rationalizes a non-myopic action must be tested, regardless of the test's cost. This raises the question of how NEWT stands in relation to the standard rationality assumption. We shall discuss this question in Section 5.1.
Analysis
Let us begin our analysis of NEWT with a simple existence result. Proof. Suppose that the stage game possesses a pure-strategy NE (a * 1 , a * 2 ). The following automata profile is a NEWT in the repeated game. Player i's automaton consists of a single state
, only condition 2 in the definition of NEWT is relevant. And indeed, players stick to their best-reply actions along the play path. Now suppose that the stage game does not possess a pure-strategy NE. Then, a
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that in every NEWT, (a
is a stage-game NE. Thus, in NEWT players begin playing myopically, and they may develop a non-myopic pattern only later in the game.
Let us turn to the task of characterizing equilibrium outcomes. The standard folk theorems provide a natural benchmark. Every individually rational outcome in a repeated 2 × 2 game can be sustained by SPE. 3 Consider, for example, the following stage game:
Every discounted-payoff profile above (1, 1) is SPE-sustainable. This is a particularly unattractive prediction, given that (A, A) is implied by individual as well as collective rationality in the stage game.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the stage game has a dominant-strategy equilibrium, which Pareto-dominates any other outcome in the stage game. Then, only infinite repetition of this outcome is consistent with NEWT.
Proof. Denote the dominant stage-game action by a * . Thus, br j (q) = a * for every q ∈ Q i and every player i. Consider the earliest period t in z(s 1 , s 2 ), in which some player -say, player 1 -plays non-myopically, i.e. a
Otherwise, if neither player plays a * at period t, then according to NEWT, there exists a period l < t, such that a l 2 = a * and p 1 (l) = p 1 (t), hence a l 1 = −a * , a contradiction. It follows that there exists a period k < t, such that p 2 (k) = p 2 (t) and a k 1 = a * . This means that player 1 plays a * against p 2 (t) at k, and subsequently both players play a * repeatedly, until player 2's automaton reaches p 2 (t) again. Since (a * , a * ) is the best outcome in the game for player 1,
Thus, NEWT effects a departure from the standard folk theorems. The departure is in an intuitive direction. When individual and collective rationality unequivocally favor the same outcome in the stage game, we do not expect non-myopic behavior to emerge in the repeated game. The reason that NEWT confirms this intuition is as follows. In NEWT, players play myopically at the beginning of the game. Therefore, at least one player is unable to justify a non-myopic move, because his past experience proves the optimality of myopic behavior.
Our next result shows that in the context of symmetric 2 ×2 stage games, a "NEWT folk theorem" arises whenever individual and collective rationality do not select a single, identical outcome.
Proposition 3 Consider a symmetric 2 × 2 stage game, which does not possess a dominant-strategy equilibrium that Pareto-dominates any other outcome in the stage game. Then, every individually rational discounted payoff profile in the repeated game can be approximated (arbitrarily closely) by some NEWT, provided that the discount factor is sufficiently close to one.
The constructive proof is given in the appendix. Let us sketch the construction for the case of repeated Chicken. Suppose that we want to sustain some individually rational play pattern in the cyclic phase. Player 1's automaton contains states that are responsible for punishing player 2 if he deviates from this pattern. These "punishment states" have an additional role: carrying out player 1's tests against player 2's automaton. By contrast, player 2's tests will not be carried out by his punishment states, but by a sequence of "preliminary states", which cannot be revisited once abandoned. Each of player 1's "punishment states" player 2's "preliminary states" is endowed with a constant transition. The induced play path has the property that player 1 starts testing player 2's threats only after player 2 finishes testing player 1's threats. Then, after all the tests are over, the players embark on the cyclic phase.
The construction is facilitated by one property of the class of 2 × 2 stage games in question, namely that players obtain their min-max payoffs in a stage-game NE. In NEWT, player i can punish player j for having tested a threat by "min-maxing" him (e.g., playing D in repeated Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma) for a sufficiently large number of periods. When player j responds myopically to the min-maxing action, we have a stage game NE, which therefore requires no further testing. Moreover, this stage-game NE is a "bad" outcome for player j. Therefore, it is possible to construct deterring threats without involving high-order threats, such that one test will not unleash a long chain of further tests.
Building Up Cooperation: The Role of Norms
Section 3 examined the set of outcomes that emerge under NEWT. In this section, we will examine how imposing certain restrictions on the structure of equilibrium strategies affects the sustainability of mutually beneficial outcomes. These structural restrictions will capture familiar norms, which govern players' reactions to the actions of one another during the repeated game. I use the term "norm of punishment" to describe a structural restriction on strategies that is shared by all players in a repeated game.
Although most of the repeated-games literature focuses on equilibrium outcomes, there are several notable studies that focus on the structure of equilibrium strategies. For the sake of brevity, I will only mention a few of them. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Ch. 8) reformulated the standard folk theorems in terms of the structure of the automata that represent equilibrium strategies. Abreu (1988) showed that allowing punishments to depend only on the identity of the deviating player entails no loss of generality for SPE. Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) 
In both games, 2c > e + b and e > c > max(b, d). In Prisoner's Dilemma, d > b, whereas in Chicken, b > d. Let the discount factor be arbitrarily close to one.
The main problem that is associated with these games is whether, and by means of what norms of punishment, it is possible to sustain long-run cooperation. Formally, given either of the two games, we will say that a NEWT (s 1 , s 2 ) sustains cooperation if a t 1 = a t 2 = C for every sufficiently large t in z(s 1 , s 2 ).
Constructive Reciprocity
Reciprocity is one of the most common and instinctive norms of punishment in repeated games. The ultimate reciprocal strategy is, of course, Titfor-Tat (given a finite-automata representation in Figure 4(a) ). Interest in reciprocal behavior, and Tit-for-Tat in particular, intensified after Axelrod's famous Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments (Axelrod (1984) ). In these tournaments, which were meant to mimic an evolutionary environment, Tit-for-Tat emerged as a "winner". Theoretical works on reputation effects in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Kreps et. al. (1982) , Watson (1994) , etc.) relied on Tit-for-Tat as a "crazy type", whose presence facilitates cooperation.
In this sub-section, we will examine a weaker notion of reciprocity.
Definition 2 An automaton s satisfies "constructive reciprocity" (CR) if whenever f (q) = C, f [τ (q, a)] = a for every a ∈ {C, D}.
4
This norm of punishment requires reciprocal behavior from players only when they are in a "cooperative state of mind". When player i is in a Cstate, he will play C (D) in the next period if his opponent currently plays C (D). Constructive reciprocity imposes no restrictions on a player's behavior when he is in a D-state. Player 2's automaton in Figure 1 and player 1's automaton in Figure 2 satisfy CR, whereas player 1's automaton in Figure 1 and player 2's automaton in Figure 2 violate this property.
Restricting attention to automata that satisfy CR entails no loss of generality under standard equilibrium concepts. In both Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken, it is possible to sustain cooperation in NE with automata that satisfy CR. (The same holds under SPE, under the first qualification specified in footnote 3.) As we shall now see, the implications of CR under NEWT are quite different. Let us first consider repeated Chicken. As we saw, in the NEWT given by Figures 1 and 2 , at least one player violates CR. This turns out to be a necessary condition for sustaining cooperation in Chicken. (s 1 , s 2 ) is a NEWT that sustains cooperation in repeated Chicken, then s 1 or s 2 violate constructive reciprocity.
Proposition 4 If
Proof. Assume the contrary -i.e., that for every player i and every state q ∈ Q i , if f i (q) = C then f i [τ i (q, a)] = a for every a ∈ {C, D}. Then, by the stage game's payoff structure, if f i (q) = D and f i [τ i (q, C)] = C, then BR j (q) = C. The reason is as follows. Given that s i satisfies CR, player j's highest continuation payoff in the repeated game is obtained when player i is in a C-state. Thus, if player j can cause player i to switch from a D-state q to a C-state by playing C, then C is necessarily the best-reply action against q.
Let t denote the earliest period t, for which a 
Another implication of NEWT is that
The intuition for this result is as follows. Constructive reciprocity implies that the build-up phase must contain a "war": a period in which both players play D. In Chicken, D is not a myopic best-reply to itself. Therefore, each player has to justify a war with an earlier test. It turns out that these tests give rise to another war, which triggers further tests, and so forth. Constructive reciprocity is a norm that generates "too many" tests in the build-up phase, and thus obstructs cooperation altogether. Let us now apply the same norm to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Given our assumptions on payoffs, the automata profile given by Figure 3 is a NEWT. First, consider player 2's reaction to s 1 : (i) BR 2 (q 0 ) = BR 2 (q 2 ) = C, a myopically dominated action; player 2 should play D when he faces q i for the first time, and play only C whenever he faces q i in the cycle, which is indeed the case; (ii) BR 2 (q 1 ) = D, a myopically dominant action; player 2 should play D whenever he faces q 1 , which is indeed the case. Now turn to player 1's reaction to s 2 : (i) BR 1 (r 1 ) = BR 1 (r 2 ) = C; player 1 should play D when he faces r i for the first time, and play only C whenever he faces r i in the long run, which is indeed the case; (ii) BR 1 (r 0 ) = D; player 1 should play D whenever he faces r 0 , which is indeed the case. Several features of this NEWT are noteworthy. First, both s 1 and s 2 satisfy CR. Second, long-run cooperation is built up during an introductory phase of five periods. This turns out to be the shortest build up phase possible under NEWT. Moreover, CR is necessary for building up cooperation in such a short time span.
Proposition 5 If NEWT (s 1 , s 2 ) sustains cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, then t * ≥ 6. Moreover, suppose that there exist a player i, a Cstate q ∈ Q i and an action a ∈ {C, D}, such that f i [τ (q, a)] 6 = a. Then, either t * > 6, or q is not visited in z(s 1 , s 2 ).
Proof. Because C is not a myopic best-reply to itself, NEWT implies that for both j = 1, 2, i 6 = j, BR i [p j (t * )] = C and there exists a period t j < t * , such that p j (t j ) = p j (t * ) and a
Moreover, t j 6 = t * − 1; otherwise, the payoff structure of Prisoner's Dilemma implies BR i [p j (t * )] = D, a contradiction. Also, since C 6 = br(D), NEWT implies that for both j = 1, 2, C = BR j [p i (t i )] and there exists a period k j < t j , such that p j (k j ) = p j (t j ) and a k j i = D. It follows that t * ≥ 5. Suppose that t * = 5. Then, k 1 = k 2 = 1 and the path must be as follows (assuming t 1 < t 2 , w.l.o.g):
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 ...
Thus, there is a unique play path (up to players' identities) that sustains cooperation with t * = 6. Moreover, in this path, p i (2) = p i (6) and p j (4) = p j (6). Therefore, every C-state q that is visited in the play path satisfies the property that f [τ (q, a)] = a for every a ∈ {C, D}.
Thus, CR is a "good" norm for building up cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, in the sense that the build-up phase is the shortest possible under NEWT. This is in sharp contrast to the destructive role played by the same norm in repeated Chicken. According to NEWT, the same norm that promotes cooperation in one game obstructs cooperation in the other.
The intuition for this difference is as follows. In both games, CR generates "wars": periods of (D, D). However, in Prisoner's Dilemma this is a stagegame NE which triggers no further tests, whereas in Chicken, a war has to be justified by tests. Note that this effect relies on the assumption that players are not exempted from testing high-order threats: wars occur only because players test the threats that rationalize their cooperative behavior. If players did not have to test high-order threats, CR would not rule out cooperation in repeated Chicken.
Forgiving Trigger Strategies
Trigger strategies constitute another familiar norm of punishment. A "trigger strategy" punishes a deviating player by "min-maxing" him for a number of periods. In a "grim" trigger strategy, the punishment phase is infinitely long. It should be clear that grim trigger strategies are incapable of sustaining cooperation in NEWT, because the players' tests cause the grim threat to be triggered as soon as they face it. (See further discussion in Section 5.1.) Thus, in the context of NEWT, the trigger strategy must satisfy some form of "forgivingness", in order to sustain cooperation. In a "forgiving" trigger strategy, the punishment phase has finite duration, and when it is over, the punishing player returns to "business as usual".
repeated Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma is a "forgiving trigger strategy" if for every state q ∈ Q i for which τ i (q, ·) is non-constant, there is a sequence of states (q 0 , ..., q m(q)+1 ), m(q) ≥ 0, such that:
3. For every n 6 = 0, m(q), f i (q n ) = D and τ i (q n , a) = q n+1 for every a ∈ {C, D}.
Forgiving trigger strategies consist of "normal" states and "punishment" states. When player j plays −BR j (q) against a normal state q ∈ Q i with a non-constant transition τ i (q, ·), player i plays D for m(q) ≥ 0 periods. At the end of this punishment phase, player i's automaton returns to q -i.e., the same "situation" in which the original deviation took place. 5 This norm involves no high-order threats: the punishment's duration is independent of the deviant player's behavior while he is being punished. The automata s 2 in Figure 1 and s 1 in Figure 3 are forgiving trigger strategies. The other automata in Figures 1,2,3 are not forgiving trigger strategies, either because they contain high-order threats or because the punishments do not consist solely of D-states.
Forgiving trigger strategies do not impose any restrictions on the ability to sustain cooperation in repeated Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma under NE.
(We need only make sure that the m(q)'s are sufficiently high.) Under SPE, forgiving trigger strategies can sustain cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, but not in Chicken. It turns out that under NEWT, this norm of punishment obstructs cooperation in both games.
Proposition 6
If (s 1 , s 2 ) is a NEWT that sustains cooperation in repeated Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma, then s 1 or s 2 are not forgiving trigger strategies.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Let (s 1 , s 2 ) be a NEWT that consists of forgiving trigger strategies and sustains cooperation in either Chicken or Prisoner's Dilemma. Let t be the earliest period in z(s 1 , s 2 ), such that a t 1 = a t 2 = C. Since D is the myopic best-reply action against C in both stage games, NEWT requires that for every player j:
For each player j, let k j denote the latest such period k. Without loss of generality, let k 1 > k 2 . Then, the play pattern in the periods that immediately precede period t is given as follows:
Suppose that the stage game is Chicken. NEWT require both players to behave myopically between k 1 and t, and D is not a myopic best-reply to itself in Chicken. Thus, either player's behavior between k 1 and t violates NEWT. Suppose that the stage game is PD. NEWT requires player 2 to behave myopically between k 2 and t, and C is not a myopic best-reply to D in PD. Thus, player 2's behavior at period k 1 violates NEWT. In either game, we obtain a contradiction.
Proposition 6 implies that forgiving trigger strategies are incapable of sustaining cooperation in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. The reason for their restrictiveness is that they force the tests that justify the players' cooperation to take place almost simultaneously. But this means that at least one player i takes a non-myopic action when he is being punished. Such a move would only be justified if player j's strategy contained highorder threats, which fails to be the case under forgiving trigger strategies. The punishment structure of forgiving trigger strategies is too simple for the tests to be properly coordinated. In order to sustain cooperation in these games, it is necessary either to allow high-order threats, or to allow the punishing player to play C in the punishment phase.
Summary. The results of this section highlight the role of norms of punishment in building up cooperation. Norms of punishment determine how one player reacts to another player's tests. More indirectly, they affect the amount of non-myopic behavior that is generated by threat testing, and consequently the amount of testing that is ultimately unleashed by a single test. The magnitude of this indirect effect varies with the stage game payoffs. (For example, constructive reciprocity generates more testing in Chicken than in Prisoner's Dilemma.) When the norm cannot accommodate the amount of testing that it generates, we obtain impossibility results such as Propositions 4 and 6.
Discussion
In this section, I discuss the interpretation of NEWT, its relation to a number of strands in existing literature, and possible variants and extensions of the concept.
NEWT and Rationality
According to NEWT, any play path that contains non-myopic behavior also contains tests. This means that players do not always adhere to strict optimization with respect to their beliefs. The question arises, to what extent is it possible to reconcile NEWT with maximizing behavior?
NEWT and ε-Nash equilibrium. Definition 1 requires players to test threats that rationalize non-myopic actions, regardless of the tests' cost. To take an extreme example, suppose that in the context of repeated Chicken, player 1's automaton contains a state q, for which: f 1 (q) = C, τ 1 (q, C) = q, τ 1 (q, D) = r, f 1 (r) = D and τ 1 (r, ·) = r. In other words, a "grim" threat is associated with q. According to NEWT, player 2 plays D as soon as he faces q. As a result, s 1 switches to the absorbing state r, such that player 2's payoff is bounded away from his first-best given s 1 .
In order that the cost of the tests induced by NEWT be negligible, equilibrium strategies should satisfy some notion of "reversibility". We will say that s i is reversible if for every state q ∈ Q i for which BR j (q) 6 = br j (q), there is an action sequence for player j that causes player i's automaton to get from τ i [q, −BR j (q)] to q. If (s 1 , s 2 ) is a NEWT in reversible automata, then for every ε > 0 there is a discount factor sufficiently close to one, such that (s 1 , s 2 ) is also an ε-Nash equilibrium. Note that all the automata given by Figures 1,2,3 satisfy this property. 6 This notion of reversibility is closely related (though not exactly equivalent) to the notion of "forgivingness". Player i's automaton is forgiving if the limit of player j's continuation payoff as the discount factor tends to one is the same for every history. (This definition is adapted from Watson (1996) .) If (s 1 , s 2 ) is a NEWT in forgiving automata, then (s 1 , s 2 ) is also an ε-Nash equilibrium, if players are sufficiently patient. The proofs of these two results concerning the relation between NEWT and ε-Nash equilibrium are straightforward and therefore omitted.
The role of reversibility or forgivingness in establishing a link between NEWT and ε-Nash equilibrium is not surprising. In repeated-game models that are subjected to incomplete-information perturbations, the assumption that perturbation strategies are forgiving ensures that patient players would have an incentive to perform tests. (See Watson (1996) and Abreu and Pearce (2002) .) In the present model, the direction of this link is reversed: players are assumed to perform tests, and forgivingness is required to ensure that these tests are approximately consistent with optimization. Fudenberg and Maskin (1990) provide an evolutionary argument in favor of forgivingness. They study repeated games between players who employ sub-optimal strategies with a small probability, as a result of mistakes. Fudenberg and Maskin show that unforgiving strategies are evolutionary unstable in the perturbed repeated game.
NEWT and rational experimentation. Our previous discussion in this sub-section attempted to reconcile NEWT with near ex-post optimization. Let us now ask whether it is possible to reconcile NEWT with exact ex-ante optimization. As emphasized repeatedly in this paper, threat testing according to NEWT is a consequence of the underlying belief-selection criterion, rather than a consequence of optimally balancing the costs and benefits of tests. A more conventional modeling approach would admit threat testing only in so far as it is consistent with expected utility maximization. According to this rationalization, each player enters the game being uncertain of his opponent's strategy. If the player is sufficiently patient, he may have an incentive to experiment. Rational experimentation with respect to his prior belief may result in what may look like threat testing with respect to his posterior belief.
This brings us to the "rational learning" model due to Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Watson (1996, Section 6) . According to this model, each player begins playing the repeated game with a more-or-less diffuse prior belief of his opponent's strategy. His belief has a "grain of truth": it assigns a positive probability to the opponent's true strategy. At every period, the player maximizes expected utility with respect to his updated beliefs. (By implication, he updates his beliefs according to Bayes' rule.) Kalai and Lehrer show that under these conditions, the players' behavior converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game in finite time.
There are two conceptual differences between rational learning and NEWT. First, the former model views threat testing as part of an equilibrating process that eventually leads to equilibrium, whereas the latter model views threat testing as part of equilibrium behavior itself. Second, rational learning views threat testing as a consequence of maximizing behavior, whereas NEWT views threat testing as a consequence of the belief-selection criterion underlying the equilibrium concept. It is easy to reconcile a given NEWT with the rational learning model, by suitably constructing each player's prior. However, this is an uninteresting rationalization because the prior is artificially constructed; it does not necessarily embody the kind of uncertainty that the tests prescribed by NEWT are intuitively meant to resolve. A more intuitive rationalization would impose the following structure player j's prior belief: some probability β, arbitrarily 7 The idea that a learning process may explain how players get to hold their beliefs about off-equilibrium behavior has inspired much of the litearture on learning extensive-game equilibria. Most of the literature assumes a learning process, in which the extensive game is played repeatedly by a population of players, who are re-matched at each round. (See Fudenberg and Levine (1997, Ch. 6.) In contrast, the rational learning model describes players who learn a repeated-game Nash equilibrium as they play the repeated game itself. The present paper is thus more closely related to the latter strand in the literature.
close to one, is assigned to a "reference automaton" s i ; the remaining probability 1 − β is assigned to a set S of automata, each dispensing with one of the threats postulated by s i . Formally, S consists of the set of all automata s 0 i , which are identical to s i , except that for some q ∈ Q i and a ∈ A, τ 0 i (q, b) = τ i (q, a) for every b ∈ A. Figure 4 provides an example for such a "structured" prior, in the context of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (under the payoff specifications given in Section 3). Figure 4(a) represents the reference automaton, whereas Figures  4(b,c) represent two of the four automata that constitute S. This structured prior captures the intuition that player j tests player i's threats because he is not sure that they are real. The question is whether a NEWT (s 1 , s 2 ) can be replicated with high probability by expected-utility maximization (by sufficiently patient players) with respect to structured priors, whose reference automata are s 1 and s 2 .
The answer is negative in general. Given that player i's automaton is given by Figure 4 (a), BR j (q) = C for every q ∈ Q i if player j is sufficiently patient. According to NEWT, player j must play D against every q ∈ Q i because C is a myopically dominated action in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Let us try to rationalize this behavior by expected-utility maximization with respect to the "structured prior", which is partially represented by It is easy to verify that if the stage-game payoffs given in Section 3 satisfy 2c < e + d, then for every β, expected utility maximization with respect to this prior justifies the same set of tests required by NEWT, as long as player j is sufficiently patient. By contrast, when 2c > e + d, an expected-utility maximizer would never not to play D against the D-state, if β is sufficiently close to one. The reason is that checking whether player i's automaton is given by Figure 4 It follows that in general, the tests that NEWT prescribes for player j cannot be perfectly rationalized by expected-utility maximization against a prior having a structure that reflects uncertainty regarding the reality of player i's threats. Sometimes, NEWT and rational experimentation against a "structured prior" prescribe the same set of tests. Sometimes, however, not all the tests prescribed by NEWT are rational to perform against such a prior. Notice, however, that the assumption of NEWT that players test threats as soon as they face them is consistent with rational experimentation: an expected-utility maximizer who finds an experiment worthwhile wants to perform it at the first opportunity.
NEWT and bounded rationality. Our observations in this subsection suggest a bounded-rationality interpretation of NEWT. From the point of view of Bayesian rationality, NEWT captures a heuristic for behaving like a patient, Bayesian rational player, whose prior has a natural structure. The player enters the game having a good guess (the "reference automaton") of his opponent's strategy. However, he is not absolutely sure that the threats he ascribes to his opponent actually exist. He wants to proceed as a Bayesian rational player and perform rational experimentation with respect to his belief. However, finding out which experiments ought to be taken involves a complicated calculation. The player may therefore resort to a simplifying heuristic: testing every threat that rationalizes a non-myopic action, as soon as he faces that threat. This heuristic may fail to implement the player's exact plan. However, if the reference automaton is forgiving (or reversible), this failure has negligible effects in terms of payoffs.
According to this interpretation, NEWT is a notion of equilibrium in games with "procedurally rational" players. It captures a decision procedure, which is reasonable and based on deliberation, but only partly consistent with Bayesian rational behavior. The procedure has a simple verbal description: "when facing a new situation, take the obvious action, but as the situation becomes familiar, take the optimal action". In the present context, player j faces a "new situation" when he faces a state q ∈ Q i for the first time. The "obvious action" in this situation is br j (q). This procedure is intuitive, and when the opponent's strategy is forgiving or reversible, the procedure functions as a simplifying heuristic for approximately solving the complex problem of rational experimentation.
In this respect, the present paper belongs to a strand in the bounded rationality literature, which formulates game-theoretic solution concepts that are based on individual decision procedures other than Bayesian rationality. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) construct an equilibrium concept for normalform games, in which players do not optimize against the opponent's mixed strategy, but against the empirical distribution given by a random sample drawn from the opponent's mixed strategy. Jehiel (2001) formulates an equilibrium concept for extensive games, in which players optimize against an incorrect, simplified belief that groups different histories in a single "analogy class". In equilibrium, the belief is only statistically correct over the analogy class. Rabin and Eyster (2001) propose an equilibrium concept for Bayesian games, in which players do not optimize against the opponents' true strategies, but against the statistical distribution of their actions. Spiegler (2002) constructs an equilibrium concept for extensive games, in which players do not choose strategies that maximize their utility, but strategies that they can justify to an imaginary "critic" in a post-game debate.
Variations and extensions
One could imagine a number of variants on Definition 1, which would capture the same underlying motivation:
Number of tests. It is possible to strengthen the definition and require that threats are never tested more than once. None of the results in this paper would change as a result of this modification.
Long-run testing. We could assume that threat testing does not terminate in the introductory phase, but persists into the cyclic phase. However, this is a reasonable assumption only if players have bounded recall. When players have perfect memory, a finite amount of evidence should suffice in order to convince them of a threat's reality.
Timing of tests. It is possible to retain the assumption that tests are confined to the introductory phase, but relax the requirement that threats are tested at the first opportunity. Propositions 3 and 6 survive this modification, but I am not sure about the other results. At any rate, I find the assumption that players test threats before optimizing against them more plausible. First, it fits a situation in which players continually try to justify their non-myopic moves as they play along. If a player wants to justify "on the spot" a nonmyopic action taken at period t, only past moves are available to him. The assumption also fits the intuitive procedure (referred to in the previous subsection) of taking an "obvious" action when facing a new situation.
Definition 1 is not necessarily confined to 2 × 2 stage games, and can easily be applied to arbitrary stage games. However, in this case we must realize that the definition does not say how player j plays against a state q ∈ Q i between his first encounter with q and the cyclic phase. In particular, we need to specify whether player j is allowed to play any action except for br j (q) and BR j (q) against q. Although exploring this extension is outside the scope of this paper, let us note that Propositions 1 and 2 are insensitive to this feature and are immediately extendible to arbitrary stage games.
Although Definition 1 is stated for repeated games with simultaneous moves, the basic idea underlying NEWT is extendible to a much broader class of infinite-horizon games. For example, in bargaining interactions the distinction between myopic and non-myopic behavior is usually meaningless, yet the idea of testing threats is as pertinent as in repeated games. In such a game, we need to reformulate NEWT in way that will specify what are the threats that a player must test. The natural generalization of NEWT would be that players must test threats that are essential for the justification of their actions, and refrain from testing threats that are not necessary for justifying their actions. I leave this generalization to future research.
For simplicity, let us first consider symmetric 2 × 2 games, for which (a, br(a)) is a stage-game NE for every action a ∈ A. (Chicken falls into this category.) Player 2's strategy s 2 is constructed as follows:
1. For every k = 1, ..., n, τ 2 [r th sequence leads to n concatenated sequences of constanttransition states. For every h = 1, ..., n, the h th sequence consists of one state, whose output is br 1 (r k 2 ), followed by N h states, whose output is br(a * ). The n th sequence leads to p * .
It is straightforward to verify that this strategy profile constitutes a NEWT. The cycle begins in the earliest period k, for which p 1 (k) = p * and p 2 (k) = r , where K is as defined above. It is straightforward to verify that this modification results in a NEWT.
